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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HEIDEGGER’S CONCEPT OF MARKET AND THAT OF GRANEL
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It is here the place to thank Dorothy Elford for her invaluable editorial contribution to the English version of this text.
It was forty years ago, in the autumn of 1960. […]

Towards the beginning of November, I no longer remember exactly how, the rumour that a prodigious young assistant was going to come to our “varsity” started circulating: he spoke, so they said, about Husserl and phenomenology; he claimed to be a follower of Heidegger; he was a “true philosopher.” There were three or four of us who decided to take the plunge and “go see”.

It was dazzling. […]

First of all, the speech […].

Then, but at the same time, […] it was the thought. That is, thinking itself. Without the slightest concession, of an extreme difficulty. (It took me one year to start understanding; but I knew that I had to understand: if the fact of thinking, [that is] of philosophizing, had to exist, it had to be this way.)

Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Andenken*
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Introduction

A. I wrote this text in order to draw attention to Gérard Granel’s thought, but not necessarily for vulgarizing it, for making it more palatable, or for reducing in some other way its level of difficulty. Rather, I would like to invite the reader into the middle of this difficulty, which, instead of pretending that I am making it easier, I will strive to keep as untouched as possible. For – before anything else – this difficulty is a highly valuable object of study, inasmuch as it is also the place where one of our most urgent questions dwells (despite the fact that not too many of us are ready to accept such urgency). Very briefly, the question I am thinking about has to do with a historical decision about the form of our global society. As such, we speak of something that concerns us all, without exception, in our very mode of being, in the way we most often are amidst the unfolding of an increasingly global and homogeneous history, caught as we are in our daily activities, in practices we carry out as our labour or as our free time, therefore, with no time and space to think through what is happening to us as world, as history, as “us.” The question is not even whether such a decision can be made by a “we.” What should concern us is that it has already been made by a more or less mysterious entity (the bourgeoisie? politics? fate? society? nature? god? Being?), and this in such a way that, by its very form, global society transforms the majority of its wage-earners into the political subalterns of their workplaces and, consequently, of the manifold hierarchies of bosses, employers and owners, with well-known and, in general, disastrous consequences not only for a free, but also for an educated thinking / action. How can we resist such a decision? Would we not need a counter-resolution? What are its conditions of
possibility? And what are these conditions after the countless historical failures of the communist endeavour? To clear a path towards the difficulty of Granel’s thought means to prepare a ground for truly addressing such questions.

I was led to a task so vague and, at the same time, as one can see, quite precise, because I wanted to take some time to clarify a number of issues concerned with the contemporary evolution of politics (“globalization”) and philosophy (its increasingly rigid standardization as 1) “continental” philosophy – usually regarded as a priori “frivolous”; 2) “analytical” philosophy – the only “scientific,” and thus “correct” one; 3) “applied” philosophy – the manifold “regional” philosophies: ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics, epistemology etc., practised increasingly on the basis of the same analytical philosophy or, in any case, in the dominant form of a positivism that does not seem to acknowledge any essential difference between philosophy and science). My basic intuition was that the comprehension of both phenomena requires a kind of “ontology of capital,” which I imagined at some point, more or less rigorously, as a re-writing of Das Kapital in the light of what could be mobilized for it from the thought that has given us Sein und Zeit. This was in 1999, immediately after my graduation, but the Hungarian philosopher Mihály Vajda, to whom I suggested this topic in the hope that I might find in him a possible supervisor for my doctoral dissertation, let me know very simply and very clearly that there was no point searching in that direction. Later, as I made progress in my work on this matter (which, of course, I never abandoned), my research started to focus more and more on something that, in the privacy of my study, I called the onto-politics of Capital, a strange combination of “essentiality” and politics, from which one can see in a perfectly clear fashion that I am a “follower” not only of Marx, but also of “the 1927 torso” (but – before this “book” even – of the “entire” question of being, as it shines through all of Heidegger’s speculative writings). About
this onto-politics I knew initially only that it would need to start from the fact that, as far as I could see, the condition of the present, in 1997 (and things have not changed much since), could be captured by the following description (re-invented here for the purposes of this introduction):
the transcendence of the power of the sovereign (monarch or people) had been replaced with the transcendence of the power of capital, that is, with the logic of the market, unquestionable in its absoluteness, the Law – not in a legal sense, of course, but the Law pure and simple, the one that holds in its iron grip the legal system too, not to speak of politics and everything else.

It was from this initial standpoint that I tried clarifying to myself the essence of “globalization,” as I came to focus my studies chiefly on Heidegger’s concept of “world” (somehow in parallel, but, after a number of suggestions derived from contemporary French philosophy – especially from the works of Jean-Luc Nancy and of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe –, without any doubt that I was still following the “main road” of my research, or, more precisely, that I had never deviated from the initial direction of my reflections).

This then was my initial interest, strongly focused on Heidegger, which left no traces in writing, or only a few, its effect being rather that it released in me a strange, intriguing “awareness” of the political “possible” of modernity. (For instance, so as not to leave things without an example, I have in view here the problems raised by Heidegger’s observation about the metaphysical sameness of “Russia” and “America”, in other words, of “(real) communism” and of “(free market) capitalism”; something that I tried re-writing, in my turn, as liberal-social-fascism). Gradually, however, the emphasis, or my main interest, shifted to Granel’s concept of Production (without my paying any special attention to the fact that, in the meantime, the topic of globalization had expired as a fashion, while the essence of the “process” – that is, the essence of our real everyday history – was still somewhat unclear, although the results achieved by Michael
Hardt and Tony Negri in their Empire are, whatever their reception may have been, a quite felicitous attempt in this direction – and probably it is not the only one).

After I had installed myself in Granel’s logical universe, I understood that one cannot reach this – so to speak “contemporary” – end of the phenomenon called “essence of globalization” without penetrating even further (that is, further than Heidegger) into “the (ontological) essence of modernity,” since globalization, world expansion (world capitalism), constitutes and exhibits the most intimate essence of modernity: its very telos. Which was perfectly clear already in Marx, but it is precisely against this background, then, that the gesture of the double repetition enacted by Granel – a repetition of Heidegger and a repetition of Marx – comes more evidently to the fore and constitutes something to be ruminated upon, to be thought over most carefully, since this gesture brings about, simultaneously with its performance, a slight difference in comparison to both Marx’s and Heidegger’s conceptions.

Globalization – modernity / essence of technology – capitalism. There is, no doubt, a circular movement here, but phenomenologically (and ontologically) it makes sense. What is the meaning of “global” or “world” in the expressions “global capitalism” or “world capitalism”? Is it only the fact that the market expands beyond the borders of nations? And / or all the other details unearthed by the theory of globalization (spatial-temporal transformations, industrial and technological shifts, global communications, multinationals, outsourcing, monopoly, worldwide standardization, the persistence of all kinds of injustices in spite of the humanist discourse about human rights and human dignity – to recall only some of the various major questions raised by this truly enormous topic)? For me, it was here, in dealing with such matters, that Heidegger and Granel acted decisively, pushing the question in the direction of what is unfolding under the guise of all these phenomena, the answer being that it is a sort of pattern, an un-real (formal)
matrix, ultimately: a “structure” (and therefore something “without substance” but acting as a “Law of the World,” to borrow Granel’s phrase).

My question about the difference between Heidegger’s concept of market and Granel’s studies the details of this matrix and, more precisely, the differences added by Granel to Heidegger’s “essence of technology” and Marx’s “capital,” that is, something that could be abbreviated as “Granel’s question of Production.”

Despite the fact that apparently this topic is dealt with in only one chapter of my essay, a familiarity with Granel’s work would show at once that “market,” “production,” “thought,” “world,” and “Being” are, in fact, components of the question of Production “in an exploded view.” This is a way of saying that the discussion is in fact all the time about this “something.” Why does it not appear in the title then? This pertains to my own difficulties in how to show the actual difficulty inherent in the concept of Production. This difficulty struck me as one that was not solvable, but, as I have said, capable of being presented in a satisfactory fashion through a comparison with Heidegger, that is, against the background of the conceptuality elaborated by the latter, precisely because Heidegger also has a concept of “pro-duction,” a concept that, united with his concept of “market,” results, as I shall show, in the famous Ge-stell. But I could have not put things in such a clear-cut manner if my attention had not already been calibrated, in its turn, by the differences and similarities between Heidegger’s concept of pro-duction and Granel’s, differences and similarities which I thought were most visible at the level of their concepts of market. Hence the title.

In fact, in the title I could have directly said world market, if I had wanted to proceed more geometrico. In reality, however, what actually takes place in Heidegger’s and Granel’s texts is the enrichment of the meaning of “market” through an enrichment of the meaning of its
“world” or “global” character. The discussion is, therefore, also about world – that is, about the same “thing” concerning which, quite curiously, Marx believed that he knew everything when he called, in his thesis on Feuerbach, for it to be changed. This, of course, was a measure of his exasperation with the eternal work of interpretation carried out by philosophers, who in the meantime understood all too well that there is only one world, and also that it is more cautious not to want too many changes in it, if one wishes to survive comfortably within its confines. A way of saying, more or less explicitly, that in this text the question is always also the political one (but interpreted, in Granel’s words, as “struggle for a World” – which presupposes, of course, that either we do not yet, or we no longer have one – a claim that might seem strange enough to trigger some thinking). However, as will become clear, I will actually be discussing neither the question of globalization, nor the “political relevance” of Granel’s concept of Production. Instead, I will leave him to speak about all these aspects of his work, not directly, but in the settled, orderly form of an answer to a precise question that I will be addressing to both his and Heidegger’s texts.

Since, given my title, this question is no longer a secret for the reader, I will not reiterate it here, but will rather draw attention to the form in which I have decided to present what I would like to say. My dissertation takes the shape of a logical painting (a table, or even a “chart”) wherein I compare Heidegger and Granel as regards five points of reference: “market,” “production,” “thought,” “world,” and “Being” – words that are also concepts, some of them even “fundamental (or basic) words” (profaned as “columns” in my comparative dossier) –, but all this while attempting to suggest that the order of the chapters is by no means random. There is, in fact, a progression in the question itself, which thus describes a trajectory. What is important about this trajectory is the fact that it is located, at least in the construction of my
hypothesis, on the very “line” that separates Heidegger from Granel, thus precisely on the limit / boundary between the two and, therefore, on the “limit” of each taken separately, a circumstance that in fact resonates quite curiously with Heidegger’s saying: “you will find me when you find my limits.”

If, however, “on the common boundary between Heidegger and Granel” could appear at some point and for a split second to be as correct a title as the present one, it is important to observe that it does not contain the reason why I suggest we should be concerned with the common limit / boundary between the two thinkers. It is this reason that I will be trying to fashion from the word “market.” What I have to say about this topic is said, as I believe is perfectly evident, obliquely, that is, by actually discussing “only” the difference between Heidegger’s and Granel’s “theses on market.” Why? Because this is what I believe is worth recalling today about this topic (in addition, of course, to what we already know from economics and Marxism), at least if market is to become a true question for “thinking” (as something distinct from science) and “life” (as something different from “action”), and this, to my mind, is even more urgent than starting to (re)read Marx in the details of his text (which, as the reader will see, is already extremely urgent).

The origin of this emphasis placed on the existential interpretation of market is not at all mysterious: I do not know how we will manage to read Marx if we forget how to diagnose metaphysics. Here, then, is the fundamental reason why I would like to take further something from (the philosophical) Tradition, at least from one of those of its areas that seem to have become less blind about the metaphysical – as an arch-structure not only of our philosophies, but also of all our actions taken in its world, of which we are even more prisoners than we are of capitalism.
Finally, however, whatever the background or backgrounds that have led to this essay, what truly counts is, of course, the content of its chapters, and this is, in fact, as I have been trying to depict it since the first lines of this “Introduction,” the why of the difference between Heidegger’s concept of market and Granel’s.

B.

With this, in a sense, the task of the introduction is fulfilled. In fact, as the reader will see in an instant, this introduction was not even absolutely necessary, because the main text also introduces itself and does so in a manner that, at least to my mind, is clear enough to constitute a beginning, that is, a secure entrance into the subject matter. If I have nevertheless insisted upon writing this introduction as well (which I now continue here by adding a second wing), it was because my intention was that the entire introduction should look like a sort of cover for this book, a kind of background, pedestal or frame (which is also the reason for the parentheses in the title) designed to illuminate the reason for the topic, as well as the logical trajectory that it has described in my work over the years. So, I would like to supplement this gesture with another, to be read either now as a continuation of the first, or after finishing the book, but thought out in such a manner as to make it possible for the reader to glimpse the rough drawings for this dissertation – from its first questions, worries and preoccupations, to the first sketchy answers (approximate and thus from many points of view imprecise or even “false”), which were ultimately sublimated in the polished text of the chapters that follow. By this gesture, which is not exactly one of including a making-of or behind-the-scenes (as they say in cinematography),
but rather one of showing the unfolding of a work in progress, I would like to satisfy a requirement that Granel mentions more than once in his works. This requirement has to do with the fact that philosophy – the philosophical text as such – has a tendency to “delete the production of meaning in the produced meaning,” that is, to efface its own genesis. While the first part of the introduction represented the “rationalised” (“objectified”) version of this genesis, due to the notes I took over the years, I can also retrace this trajectory in a different way. This will involve picturing the initial cloud of problems within which my so-narrowly-specialised interest in Granel’s concept of Production had already found its vantage point, but was still volatile or magmatic in its details. Obviously, by the very fact of being a selection, the whole composed by the fragments that I will offer to the reader represents, in its turn, an act of (more or less rationalised) reconstruction, or re-enactment even. (But this limitation I would not know how to overcome and it may be that a higher level of “logical primitiveness” than this is not even recommended).

I will, then, present something that I have called: “Graneliana (Fragments from a Notebook of Observations, 2006-2009)”. As a suggestion for the reading of these fragments, I could say that, in the selection that I am proposing, what actually matters pertains to the topics themselves and the questions they raise, to the various problems formulated, and not so much to the pointillistic or just suggested answers offered to these questions. All of this allows for a localisation of the vantage point that holds together a to-be-thought. Any other effect of meaning falls outside what I am intending to communicate, in the sense that, in terms of my current positions on the various issues, I have already overcome or refined many of the responses to be found here, as I will be able to demonstrate in the actual chapters of my work. This means that the following notations must be taken into consideration in their “raw” character, although I
nevertheless believe that they are not completely without their use, since they permit the reader to follow a topic through the process of its formation. This is, in fact, the fundamental reason why I felt no concern about allowing these jottings to be read by others, despite their “fragility” (that of simple brushstrokes, of more or less vague sketches).

I have tried to avoid any editorial treatment of the material. I have limited my interventions to some small additions marked in square brackets – hence the enigmatic character of some of the formulations. They are so, and, up to a point, they must remain so, that is, enigmatic, even to myself (for instance, to give one example, when I read, more or less in bafflement, the statement: “capitalism is a communism in a larger sense”). These signs are, to put it most clearly, mnemonic hieroglyphs, simple things-to-keep-in-mind whose truth vibration I try to guess, signs, however, that – at least to my mind – make (some) sense. To continue with the example I have chosen, I believe that it is trying to say that, in the political oeuvre erected by the capitalist principle – the extermination of the national, neo-barbarity, the overwhelming quantity of all commodities, political blindness –, there also operates a homogenization that brings to light the common, what is the same in our existences, allowing then for a kind of laying-bare of existence, which, insofar as it dismantles our more or less classic models of sacredness – or of authority –, in brief, our identity signs (that is, “signs” that exclude the children of other gods), makes us perhaps a little less the slaves of our own illusions. This would mean that it brings about something that could be called an “emancipation,” one that is not at all direct or given, equal, that is, homogeneous everywhere, but that seems to be the tendency we inherit from the stormy twentieth century. The point is that, in the chaos unleashed in this way by global capitalism, we should find, by “narrowing” – that is, by limitation, contraction –, the means to free ourselves for the possibility of a kind of production that does not split us, like a destiny, into
capitalists and proletarians… But I will halt the course of further developments and elucidations
of this example here. I have given these details only in order to indicate something of the
“internal” mode of utilisation of the theses and questions to follow, and also in order to make it
explicit that the fragments must be read from the point of view of the potentialities they bear
within them, and not simply to the letter. Finally, I would like to mention that, even if some of
the fragments speak about the sketch of a possible dissertation and its chapters, they do not in
fact mean the chapters of the present work and they should therefore not be understood in that
way. This being said, the “hieroglyphs”:

Graneliana (Fragments from a Notebook of Observations, 2006-2009)

What is to be thought?

I let myself be touched by this question or, I do not even know how, it happened to me.
There is something paralyzing in it; something that looks at you with the eyes of a
Medusa. It is a solitary question, one that pushes you into solitude; all the writings you
would peruse in order to find an answer to this question have already solved it, they know
what is to be thought, perhaps without ever encountering the question itself. There is
something that has the nature of a limit in the zone into which this question pushes us,
something that cannot be simply ignored after one has been touched by it, but, at the
same time, it can neither be solved, nor dissolved. It imposes a task: to stay at the level of
this question, not to annihilate it, because this question is all that annihilates. (May 2006)

*

Prolegomena to any future left that would want to present itself as an alternative to global
capitalism (September 2006)
If one must indicate the place where this account comes from: the left, a left that is today doubly utopian – namely, without a place; it cannot be found today as “real” politics; it is only today that the left has become truly u-topian.

One can question post-communism from this side also: what does it mean that there is no political left [in the proper anti-capitalist sense, as a true communist party]? (September 2006)

For the thesis.

I shall not forget about the “darkening of the world,” spirit, light. This can be a separate chapter. (September 2006)

Is the question of the world a simple question about a technical term? Is “the question of the world” “solved” in *Sein und Zeit*? Is it at least posed? Or even formulated as an actual question? Or is it, in fact, only a “tool” for developing the question of being? For instance, what is the “matter” of world? Is world not a symbolic construction? (September 2006)

The question of the world is always the question of our world. It is, in fact, an attempt at discussing at the same time both the exterior and the interior of philosophy (the tradition of philosophy as a discipline of comprehending what is and what is going on, *and*, on the other hand, the various *realities* that appear as *issues* for such a comprehension). (October 11 2006)
It is not at all certain that one must go back to Marx. What does it mean to go back to an author? To repeat. To reinvent. To interpret. To re-interpret. There are, in general, two causes or, more precisely, two types of reasons that make us repeat in general: the need to read / to interpret, in fact, to understand what is going on in an author and, secondly, the imperiousness, the necessity of the contemporary, which makes an author indispensable. Perhaps these two types of reasons are not so different and not so separate as they would seem at first glance. After all, each author to whom one can and must go back is more than a text. Or even a mass of texts, of fragments, of “scrap paper.” An author to whom one “goes back” never “left,” but is here, present in one form or another. (January 2007)

The “Report for the Condemnation of Communism” leaves room for a major ambiguity. Without drawing any conclusions about its objectiveness, or without explicitly stressing them, this ambiguity must at least be specified, insofar as it is, in fact, the site where the historical-political debate about “communism” should find its place. What shines through, without actually being mentioned, in the lines of the “Tismâneanu Report” is precisely that communism is still debatable – and this by the very fact that the question of a debate and of its conditions is practically evacuated and, therefore, in spite of the objectivity it attempts to promote, the report proves itself to be a perfectly interested politico-theoretical piece. (February 2007)

In order to characterise today’s knowledge in the intimate practice of its production, one could say that what we have to deal with here is, most rigorously speaking, a “statistical” knowledge. This also in the sense that the very principle of knowledge seems to consist of an “addition” / “synthesis” (?) of as many points of view as possible – of course, especially those that do not disturb the various powers. (February 2008)

Yesterday, as I was reading Granel’s account of Marx’s “early” philosophy, an account in which, as opposed to what Althusser says, Granel seems to demonstrate that there is, in
fact, a continuity between the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and *The German Ideology*, I got a few ideas.

First of all, that we have in Granel all the elements for developing or, perhaps, for re-developing the question of the proletariat, against the contemporary “dogma” that it has been replaced with something else: multitude, for instance. I believe that the two levels at which these two concepts are developed are different. “The proletariat,” besides the fact that, as Granel says, it was utilized by Marx to function both inside and outside reality, can only be the name of a “social function,” of a “social relationship,” if not even of “the social relationship.” There is today no direct relationship between this position within production (one must clarify *which* production one is speaking of here – there are two possibilities: economic production and world production – see “Incipit Marx”) and a “social class”-type pattern in a sociological sense [lower classes – or working classes –, middle classes, upper classes]. Therefore, in fact, we are not capable of extracting our concept of proletariat from “experience” – the communist struggle is a principled struggle, the communist lack is only partially the lack of the poor, who, as soon as they receive better pay, are ready to forget about what is principled. Anyhow, a sort of confusion between proletariat as a principle and proletariat as a social class is already present in Marx, even in *The Communist Manifesto*.

The question is: what dictates this confusion? Given that we can agree that it is not simply an error.

In any case, the important thing is that a question of the “historical (or) revolutionary subject” [Claude Karnoukh] lurks behind the question of production.

The second thought, which I will cut shorter in order to elaborate on it later, has to do with what exactly Granel does in his text: namely, a general interpretation of transcendental philosophy from Descartes via Leibniz and Kant to Hegel (Feuerbach), preparing in this way for the reading of the *Manuscripts*. This takes me to the idea of studying the *facture* of readings elaborated by Granel of large sections of philosophy. In this particular case, we have to do with a reading that starts from Plato and Aristotle and demonstrates how transcendental philosophy is a movement from “Cause” to “Origin.” I will leave these two terms in their enigmatic character, but I will come back to them later. (May 15 2008)

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How “topical” Hegel’s critique of the science of his time is! (June 16 2009)

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1. Studying Granel helps us recapitulate a series of major topics, relevant not only for philosophy and theory in general, but also for our social and political life.

2. The apparent diversity of topics in his works (from phenomenology to the question of the university) presents a very subtle internal articulation.

3. If everything that can take place in an age of being depends on an underlying interpretation of being (from science to action), the question is what dictates an interpretation of being, if one agrees that such an interpretation is not simply a product of human subjectivity (as philosophy from Plato to Husserl via Descartes thought).

4. Granel’s theory of capitalism, or his elucidation of capitalism, can be considered as an alternative theory of globalization. An extraction of the principle that guides the development called globalization. As such, this theory competes with those we owe to M. Hardt and T. Negri (neo-imperialism) or I. Wallerstein (world system theory), as well as with other theories of globalization, simply Marxist (world market) or cultural. The greatest achievement of Granel’s theory is that it avoids moralism (Rousseauist socialism as G. M. Tamás understands it [in “Telling the Truth about Class”]).

Observation regarding point 3. We do not control the production of an interpretation of Being – precisely because Being is essentially imperceptible, ungraspable. The interpretation of Being is not the result of a human operation [but our operations are the result of an interpretation of Being]. Not even the establishing of the fundamental words of an epoch is such an operation. Precisely because it can take place only after an epoch of Being has already unveiled itself. (June 24 2009)

* *

Wealth production as principle of all human activities, especially of the public ones, but also of the private. (Clarify this.) (June 24 2009)

* *

Regarding point 3. Philosophy is, then, together with poetry [art in general], religion, politics and science, a document of the epoch of Being.
Ultimately, what Granel does is to extract the principle that guides the current world.

Question: is this principle the same as the domination exerted by the logic of profit? For, if it is, then I have to demonstrate what Granel’s added value is.

I believe that, as regards the basic content of the thesis, it is the same, but the critique formulated from the perspective that focuses on the “logic of profit” is rather moralistic, while from Granel’s point of view (the unlimited production of unlimited wealth) the picture is different, richer and more precise. (June 24 2009)

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In regard to Marx, when studying his 1844 ontology Granel is interested, in fact, in what gives Marx’s analysis its effectiveness. (June 24 2009)

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The principle (unlimited production of unlimited wealth) is also what provides the link between such phenomena as the cultural industry, scientific research, the destiny of religion, of arts, etc. (June 24 2009)

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The study of facts is the study of the particular, but, as Hegel demonstrates, there is no research into the particular without the universal – the singular. (Phenomenology of Spirit, Introduction) (June 2009)

* 

The study of facts, of cases, case studies blocks the possibility of an overarching view – a type of knowledge left for anthologies and having a vaguely instrumental value.

In this way, the links between facts can be avoided; the focus is, similarly, on a single case – the situation of the researcher in today’s university – without any relationship with the economy, etc., and other spheres of existence. (June 2009)
The first thing to be discussed would be *the different meanings* of the “infinite”! That is, its only and precise meaning [in Granel]. This should be in the second chapter.

Granel’s thought is also a response to the Leninist question: “what is to be done?” This answer claims that everything that one can “do,” everything that is “feasible” is limited / commanded by an epoch of Being [as in Heidegger]. (June 2009)

Granel’s thought is not without relationship to Nancy’s thinking on revolution. The latter establishes as a condition for revolution the avoidance of falling into a form of sovereignty or into that of a metaphysical fundament. Granel’s question makes this more concrete: is what commands the regression of left-wing revolution a form of sovereignty or a form of fundament? (June 2009)

Granel also goes against Nancy in a different question. Nancy claims, in his *Compereance*, that there is no need for a new reading of Marx. Taken too literally, this would mean that Marx can be abandoned (even though we could keep some of his truths). Granel does not only think differently in this case. He also produces the first steps in a reading of Marx – new only insofar as it corrects some obvious mistakes of previous readings [Althusser’s, for instance]. (June 2009)

The central paradox of Granel’s thought is: how can we claim that we have identified the *historic [Geschichtlich]* law of an epoch of Being and, simultaneously, that Being is
imperceptible [ungraspable]? In other words, that the Heideggerian question about the meaning of “to be” teaches us the extent to which we are incapable of even posing the question of Being and, simultaneously, that we can decipher the concrete meaning of Being in a given epoch?

This can also be formulated as an intra-Heideggerian question, but it is true that the question is valid only in Granel’s interpretation of Heidegger.

This should be the discussion of the first chapter. (June 2009)

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It already came to my mind yesterday, but I forgot to jot it down.

After the discussion of the internal paradox in thinking of the history of Being, I should break ground, perhaps in a third chapter, for the question of world. (June 2009)

* 

Revolution is imagined either as pure chaos (Badiou, Žižek, Nancy, Blanchot), or as an organised and lengthy process. In the second sense, education – propaganda – is an essential requirement. How do people achieve the knowledge required by a change?

(This can serve as an introduction to the question of the university.) (June 2009)

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If we withdraw the capacity of action to change the actual social and political order – if we refuse to action its position as a subject – what are we left with? (“Who Comes After the Subject?”) (June 2009)

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The thing all revolutionary mobilisation must face is Verfallen in Heidegger’s sense. [Confusion, blindness, half measures.] (June 2009)
Perhaps we will have to go beyond the fundamental position of modern metaphysics (the subject-object relationship). What would a revolutionary movement look like beyond this position? (June, 2009)

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In the text (the current introduction: June 30 2009): the next step must be the presentation of the apparent paradox of Granel’s position and the interrogation of how production achieves this “privileged” position.

After this I can insert a portrait of Granel. (June 2009)

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The paradox discussed in the second chapter can appear only if we still think in terms of a split between subject and object. Instead of this, Granel proposes a question of the world as praxological totality. (June 2009)

* *

What type of sentence is: “the unlimited production of unlimited wealth is the most intimate law of the world”?

What is “a law of the world”?

(Chapter three.)

(The question arises after reading the characterization Heidegger makes of Kantian ideas, pp. 36-37)

The question is equivalent to the following: what is the nature of this law? And, after this, if we agree to make this transition, what is the nature of historicity, of the history of Being?
What is clear: “nature” must not be taken to stand for: what practical effects historicity has, but: what is the nature of historicity if it is capable of having practical effects at all?

Are Heidegger’s and Granel’s concepts of world the same? Are historicity and “the most intimate law of the world” the same “thing”? (June 2009)

* *

For the second chapter (the nature of historicity): the world worlds. This is an “action” that comes before all others.

_Faire-monde._ (June 2009)

* *

Is the worlding of world the same as historicity? (June-July 2009)

* *

Keep in mind Granel’s formulation / commentary about the world market (the being-world of the world is market). (June-July 2009)

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“The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else.” (June-July 2009)
Infinitisation is one of the fundamental terms and one of the fundamental problems in Granel, insofar as what is meant by this is the negative of finitude. As such, infinity is something oriented against the fundamental truth of human existence: Da-sein. (June-July 2009)

* *

To clarify the status of Granelian discourse.

Is it a question (a leap into the speculative void) how to treat a thought? Can it receive the status of a theory? Should we find a new category for “post”-metaphysical thinking (i.e., of thinking that is aware of the existence of something as metaphysics in Hegdeger’s sense)? This question is crucial because it can provide us with the general principles of how to treat a text (as a hypothesis, etc.). Granel innovates in regard to the phenomenological method – we must gain a different meaning for theoria: not “to see,” but “to testify” – to represent (by delegation, so to speak) a problem. It is a certain insistence that cannot simply be ignored as an event of the world. It is a certain technique of bringing into the visible. This is the matter that requires clarification in the context of Granelian thinking (reading – as the sole “method” of this post-phenomenology?). (July 16 2009)

* *

The modality of expressing all Granelian concepts can run through a discussion about the effect of Granel’s thinking on the concepts of revolutionary socialism (class, proletariat / bourgeoisie, class consciousness – on both sides –, politics, law) –

+ labour and capital → because Granel himself discusses such issues, even if only briefly. (July 16 2009)

* *

For point 1 – the status of Granelian discourse – think about his statement about the fact that thinking in the text is always of an oral tradition. (July 16 2009)

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All this interrogation should explain why Granel did not build a proper theory [doctrine] of production [some sort of “Being and Capital”]. (July 16 2009)

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Question: what allows Granel to decide, to see the particular questions of class, proletariat, labour, etc. as he sees them? Answer: the theory of production. His operational concepts regarding philosophy: reality vs. formality / ideality. (July 16 2009)

* 

Historicity does not inscribe history in a given destiny, but gives the principle of organisation of a historic age. (July 16 2009)

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In order to solve the question of the difference between the philosophical dimension (un-real) and reality, we must remember that the name of Granel’s project is arch-politics, politics of principles. It is important to clarify what this means. (July 21 2009)

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Production. – the generic activity of the subject

material production

the spirit of richness (July 22 2009)

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The question that always interested me is the metaphysical apparatus of capitalism. It interested me because it is important to see what holds capitalism. What keeps it in place? Capitalism as popular philosophy – as folklore in Gramsci’s sense. (July 22 2009)

*

I arrived at Granel because I was interested in an – effective – enquiry into the essence of capitalism. This is the question that interested me and keeps on interesting me. The essence of capitalism, insofar as capitalism is the essence of our times. Capitalism not only as a mode of production, but also as a mode of being that becomes world. (July 22 2009)

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Capitalism already is a communism in an enlarged sense. (July 22 2009)

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The question about the essence has today become not necessarily illegitimate, but simply a nonsense [nobody feels the need to bother with such questions, everybody wants “full and ready-made solutions”]. This is an effect of capitalism. But the great topics / universal (photographic) developers of philosophy have not lost their legitimacy. Capitalism is effectively a global, popular, universal philosophy. It proposes – or has – an interpretation of the essence of man and world, of knowledge and of all things – it is, therefore, a total philosophy [if this formula is not tautological]. It continues to act metaphysically – it is metaphysics [the metaphysics even]. (July 22 2009)

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Reflection upon the essence of capitalism has, of course, a history, to which both Marx and Heidegger belong. What does it mean to reflect upon capitalism’s essence? It means to leave it behind, to take a step outside of it. (July 22 2009)

*
Granel is important for such an act of breakthrough. (July 22 2009)

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The question about the essence of capitalism is also the question about the force of capitalism, about its vitality, its persistence. (Capitalism is, in fact, a revolutionary force and continues to be so.) Its force can be located or identified in the general translatability contained by the general equivalent (money). We do not yet measure with precision the effects of this entity in its capitalist meaning, that is, insofar as money – a sign of sovereignty in the past – becomes effectively not only the general equivalent of commodity production or exchange, but also an ontological operator [actualising and tailoring potentialities], whose effects (practices) are comparable to those of language. (July 22 2009)

*

Granel’s “concept” of Production does not pertain to some (methodological) invention, but is the product of a reading. He does not develop a “theory-of-production”, but extracts the fundamental features of “world.” What results is a tool. My thesis serves as some sort of user’s guide to this tool. (July 2009)

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The theoretical, the phenomenological – the extraction of “how” from “is.” Can we speak about a Granelian (?) phenomenology of production? (July 2009)

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The major problem: the “disciplinary identity” of production in Granel (philosophy, post-philosophy?), then its “figural identity” (philosopheme, motif, topic?). (October 17 2009)
The thesis I shall be defending in the following pages is that – in spite of some strong appearances to the contrary – there is, however, a quite important difference, significant from more than one point of view, between Heidegger’s concept of market and that of Granel. This difference, despite the fact that it leaves its marks in the flesh of the texts, is not yet transparent at the level of its immediate contexts – that is, of those in which it can be initially noticed – either in the finesse of its details, or in the density of its meanings and even less in its general significance. From a purely intuitive point of view, one would quasi-naturally expect that two “concepts” – conceptualizations, schematizations, meanings – elaborated by two different thinkers would differ, just as two handwritings, or two perspectives in their visual fields do (in the sense that, as Wittgenstein teaches us, *stricto sensu* no-one can see through someone else’s eyes). Yet the demonstration will show that in this instance nothing is more thoroughly confounded than our “natural” expectations: Heidegger’s concept of market and Granel’s catch our eyes precisely because they resemble each other “as two drops of water.” Therefore, the self-evidence of the difference shows itself *first* as the strangeness of a same, but of a same without identity, as will become clear in an instant from the examples I will quote. This is what seemed to be worth a lengthier discussion. But let us proceed in an orderly fashion.

If Heidegger needs no introduction for the public of contemporary philosophy, the same is not true of Granel.

Gérard Granel (1930-2000) is a French philosopher from the second half of the past century, that is, from a period and a place that gave birth, as is widely known, to an extraordinary
theoretical effervescence, one from which the thinking called today the “continental style” will nourish itself for a long time yet, given that it survives the bureaucratic-positivistic hysteria so characteristic of our times. In spite of his former high profile in this context (the true fame of a great master, confirmed even by entirely non-partisan commentaries\(^1\)), internationally Granel never achieved the notoriety of a Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Althusser, Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, Badiou or Rancière. Today, even in France, his name, once sacred\(^2\), is mentioned increasingly rarely, and this, sadly, in spite of the existence of some “followers” who are trying with all their might to cultivate an interest in his oeuvre.\(^3\) There are students of French philosophy today who have never heard of anyone called “Granel,” and there are also a number of “expert” books (or studies) on the same topic which simply “forget” to mention his name within the history of contemporary French philosophy.\(^4\) I wonder why.

However sad it may be to see the signature even of someone like Alain Badiou at the foot of such monuments of negligence,\(^5\) it makes little sense for us to become detectives with regard to the current lack of public enjoyed by Granel’s thought (and this is all the more the case in that, as I was saying, this lack is by no means absolute; Granel also has his followers). If we were to ask ourselves why he is not better known today, I would answer that there could be a number of reasons for this, no one of them more mysterious or more special than the others. Among these, Granel’s political views are arguably not the last, but since these derive from his thought, the

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1 See George Steiner, Lessons of Masters (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 110.
3 See the website <www.gerardgranel.com>, as well as the collective volume mentioned in the previous note.
5 Cf. his article quoted in the previous note.
strangeness of the latter (which is a collateral effect of the depth that characterises his interrogation) seems to me to be the main reason for the “oblivion” or, more precisely, of “his being swept under the carpet.” Granel is not an easy author, and exegesis of his oeuvre is still in a very incipient phase. Even in the circle of his friends, admirers and pupils, interpretation still lingers at the level of elucidating his most significant theses and of attempts at formulating hypotheses (more or less perceptive) about the general meaning of his thought or, at least, of some of its major thematic sections. For my part, I do not intend to present my work as an infatuated attempt at outdoing such theoretical initiatives. To a certain extent, any attempt to read a philosopher’s work as a whole must proceed slowly (as the Sisyphean work of interpretation requires from us) and without being able to extend or to immediately continue the thought it tries to comprehend. Because of this, such attempts only testify – not so much explicitly, of course, but perhaps also not completely unintentionally – to the freshness, tenderness, “un-treatable” character and overall difficulties of a particular mode of thinking (first of all as regards “processing” or “manipulating”: cutting out, truncating, re-digesting, re-melting, re-welding, commenting, prolonging, applying, quoting). For every authentic thought is sovereign in the turns of its writing, from which it cannot be “unglued” in order to be re-said with the same noetic effectiveness (or at least with a similar one). This is the main reason that makes all attempts at summarising or re-narrating sound incomparably flatter than the original they try to clarify. For this reason, in my turn, in the work I have dedicated and am still dedicating to “Graneliana,” I have striven to imitate Granel where he himself at least partially imitates Heidegger, that is, in the realm of reading: in other words, I wanted to read Granel in the way that he teaches us (in the footsteps of Heidegger, but also in those of Michel Alexandre) that one can read.6

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For, similarly to some of his forerunners, as well as to some of the famous colleagues of his generation (Derrida being, no doubt, the best known of them), Granel too is an indefatigable philosopher of reading. The most evident engine powering his thought is a way of reading that has nothing to do with its homonym that can be measured in numbers of pages and authors, but presupposes the deciphering of various modes of thought by following the “scaffolding” erected by their obscurities and presuppositions, according to a “rigour” or a “technique” that has been hardened, refined, enriched by a lifetime of relentless, fearless tracking down of the strangest, most improbable and most obscure configurations of the to-be-thought. His “art” (in order to convey something of its atmosphere, and not so much of what it actually achieves in the area of renewing the theoretical vision) consists of painting broad transverse logical frescoes that span the philosophical tradition, readings that follow the lines of flight of the history of ontology or, more precisely, of its systematic demolition [Abbau] (in good Heideggerian style, but on trajectories of thinking slightly different from those of Heidegger).

But since by mentioning the name of Heidegger for a second time, we have inevitably arrived at questions of what are traditionally called “influences,” I must say from the very beginning that Granel’s thought has, in fact, two origins, two sources that he allows to unite and flow into each other to form a single river of problems. These are, first of all, the French school of perception (especially through the pedagogy of Michel Alexandre), and then, but not at all secondarily, German phenomenology: Husserl, of course, but, equally, and in an incomparably more decisive fashion, the development of the Husserlian seed in the soil of Heidegger’s thought.\(^7\) Does this mean that Granel has two “philosophies” (as some say about Wittgenstein and Heidegger)? Not at all. It is rather that Granel’s thought takes place within the in-between of

\(^7\) *Traditionis traditio* is perhaps the most illustrative place to locate this double source of Granel’s thought.
these two languages (which are in no way “merely” two languages among others, but the very languages of modern philosophy – Kant, for the French school of perception; Husserl, for phenomenology –, diverted, “surpassed” or, rather, aggravated by Alexandre and Heidegger). This in-between will have been enriched over the years as Granel welcomed into its logical space the challenge represented to the type of reading he had developed by a series of other authors, such as Marx, Gramsci, Wittgenstein, Dessanti, Saussure, Jakobson, Lacan, etc. But far be it from me to pretend that by giving this list of proper names I am presuming to exhaust what should be said about who and especially about how Granel read. And the same goes for the exhaustion of “influences.” I have not, for example, mentioned the name of Aristotle, who is from many points of view crucial, even though Granel wrote relatively little about him. Despite this, however, Aristotle marked Granel just as decisively as Marx or Heidegger did. Similarly, I have not said a word about Granel’s reading in œuvres such as those of Plato, Descartes or Kant (the last-mentioned being another capital figure). Perhaps one should also mention Nietzsche, but I do not intend to go deeper into the details of influences. It is, I admit, true that a complete review of these would help towards a general, historico-philosophical classification, but this is relatively unimportant for the to-be-thought of the question that I am intending to develop. All I wanted was to give an idea of the most salient forms of relief that occur in Granel’s logical landscape.

Similarly, I will not dwell on Granel’s life story. To do so would involve combining, as in a collage, fragments from various portraits painted by those who knew him personally, but this would bring me too close to the danger of eliminating from these fragments a tone that testifies better to what “Granel” was than any list of chronological data. I will therefore refer the reader
interested in bibliographical matters to the works of these friends and colleagues. They are doubtless in a better position to review the important moments of Granel’s life, of his career as a teacher, translator and editor. For our more particular question, his biography is not of great importance.

Let us then return to my thesis and to its documents. Everything starts with two passages, one from Heidegger, the other from Granel. It is in these two fragments that the appearance of a non-difference between the two thinkers’ concept of market is the strongest, but it is also here that one may locate what I have called the (quite obvious) trace of the fact that there is also a difference (and even a slight disagreement, I would say) between the two.

Heidegger:

What is human about humans and thingly about things is dissolved, within the self-assertion of producing, to the calculation of the market value of a market that is not only a global market spanning the earth but that also, as the will to will, markets in the essence of being and so brings all beings into the business of calculation, which dominates most fiercely precisely where numbers are not needed.

Granel:

The apparently banal expression “world market” does not designate only an extension of the phenomenon of economic exchanges beyond the borders of nations; it signifies more profoundly that Capital defines the being-world of world itself as “market”.

In regard to market, Heidegger and Granel seem to agree that its global extension is not everything. Both have something to add. Indeed, they both try to say that market is a “central” phenomenon. In Heidegger, market installs itself in the very essence of Being, that is, in the centre of the centre (if we were to contemplate for a second what “essence” and “Being” mean

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10 Gérard Granel, “Monoculture? Inculture?” in Apolis (Mauvezin: Trans-Europ-Repress, 2009), 84.
for him). For Granel, meanwhile, market represents nothing other than the “being-world of the world” (être-monde du monde he says in French, giving an interpretative translation of Heidegger’s concept of Weltlichkeit der Welt\(^1\)) – a figure intended to suggest, beyond any doubt, a similar central position, if not actually the same centrality as that envisaged by Heidegger. This therefore provides us with one “strong appearance to the contrary” (that is, with the impression that there is no essential difference whatsoever between these two concepts of market).

The passage from Granel seems to directly answer the one from Heidegger, thus drawing our attention to the fact that – just as “the expression ‘world picture,’ understood in an essential way, does not mean ‘picture of the world’ but, rather, the world grasped as picture” (the entire structure of Granel’s phrase evoking, in fact, this paragraph from “The Age of the World Picture”\(^1\)) – the expression “world market” (Weltmarkt) can be read in the same key, designating then something a little more than the “global extension” of market, namely exactly what Heidegger envisaged: the Being of beings.

Is this “correction” (if it is a correction at all) necessary? Does the passage from Granel say more or something other than the passage from Heidegger?

What does not appear at all in Heidegger is Capital (and especially not with Granel’s capital “C,” that is, as a principle, something archaic in the sense of the Greek word arché). The central position of the market seems, instead, to be a derivative of the “will to will” (an expression that names the principle, the keystone of modern metaphysics, as is shown by all of

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\)


Heidegger’s meditations on Nietzsche\textsuperscript{13}). Therefore, in Heidegger, as opposed to Granel, the centrality of the market seems to be not a “deed” of Capital (although it is hard to understand how one can speak of world market – Weltmarkt – without implying at least that the mode of production globalized in this way is the capitalist one, and the concept that we have here is, indeed, one that belongs to Marx). But Heidegger never mentions Capital, and market seems to be a rather secondary motif in his writings. Here the text moves over it quite rapidly, and in other places “market” appears very rarely, disguised under the motif of “profit” or, as I will show, simply metamorphosed into the concept of Bestand\textsuperscript{14} (which is the centrepiece of the famous Ge-stell, the essence of technology). This is why it is so surprising to see “market” in a central position (notwithstanding the suspicious smiles of those who might believe that, in this year – 1946 –, thinking could only take place as an effect of the Denazification Committee). What is, however, the more precise meaning of what Heidegger does here? The centrality of market is expressed through the verb markten, which, in the intransitive utilisation we find in the text, means “to bargain,” “to haggle,” but, depending upon the way the signifier is tailored, it can also mean to market (as, for instance, the world worlds, the market markets, that is, “it sells and buys,” “it sets up its stall,” etc.) What does “to bargain in the essence of Being” mean? Heidegger elucidates this expression by: “making all beings the business of calculation.” What is translated by “business” is the German Handeln, which also means “commerce,” “trade,” “bargain,” and these meanings are probably not to be ignored, insofar as they have the effect of highlighting the centrality of “bargain” for the type of care (Sorge) that is dictated by market as the matrix of un-veiling beings.

\textsuperscript{13} See, for instance, Martin Heidegger, “Nietzsche’s Word: <God is Dead>” in Off the Beaten Track, pp. 176-177, as well as “Why Poets?”, in the same volume, pp. 209, 218.
Let us not, however, ignore the fact that the logical relationship outlined by Heidegger in the fragment above remains, despite all this, a quite strange one. Market is considered first in its “world market” aspect, and then as “will to will.” It is, therefore, the same market, with the slight difference that it seems to be “central” only or at any rate mainly in its “will to will” character. What are we to understand from all this?

From Granel’s side, “will to will” simply disappears as a motif, although from the fact that when he articulates the centrality of market he uses – at least in part – Heidegger’s conceptual framework, we might conclude that he is invoking the entire chain of Heideggerian concepts or the entire mode of thinking from which he extracts his main terms. Is this the case? How much does Granel wish to take over from Heidegger?

By asking such questions, one can see how the question of the difference between the two concepts of market sends us back to the texts and to their reading, even though this return now finds us perhaps somewhat better instructed as to what is to be sought there. However, even a glance as brief as this has enabled us to discover that the difference between Heidegger’s concept of market and Granel’s must be searched for right here, in the details of how they conceptualize the centrality of market. We are therefore holding the end of some sort of a thread in our hands, and by using it we can start to reel in our topic.

Let us begin with Heidegger and return at once to the question mentioned previously. The market seems, indeed, to undergo a strange split. First, it is located as a “common” concept (in 1946 the expression “world market” was not something strange), but a concept regarding which Heidegger probably does not forget, even for a split second I would say, that it is a fundamental word in the thought of Marx and that, if it is fundamental, this is because it does not stand alone,
but forms a common body in solidarity with other fundamental words, such as, for instance, production and capital. This detail is important, since, in the preceding sentence of our paragraph – which I will quote in a moment –, Heidegger speaks directly about “the process of production”). All the lexical choices thus show that we have here a more or less tentative beginning of the dialogue with Marx’s thought that Heidegger mentions in the same period (for instance, in the “Letter on Humanism”\(^\text{15}\)), even though here it is through an interpretation of Rilke that this beginning takes place. This “dialogue with Marx” is, in fact, an elucidation of a whole section of Rilke’s meditative poetry (namely of questions pertaining to the so-called “de-realization” of “things” as soon as they are touched by the “vibration of money”), but I would like to reconstruct here the entire moment of thought from which I extracted the quotation on market, precisely in order for us to be able to get a better “feel” of the exact turn of how Heidegger’s thought progresses. Rilke speaks about how traditional “things” – such as a house, a fruit, “as our grandparents knew them” – are being replaced by things “brought from America,” things which he deems to be “void, etc., etc.” Here is Heidegger’s commentary:

However, this Americanness is already only the collected recoil of the willed essence of modern Europe onto a Europe for which, in Nietzsche’s fulfillment of metaphysics, there were forethought some areas at least of the essential questionableness of a world in which being has begun to rule as the will to will. It is not America that is the primary threat to us of today; in fact the unexperienced essence of technology had already threatened our ancestors and their things. What is significant in Rilke’s reflection is an attempt to rescue still the things of the forefathers. With even greater forethought, we must recognize what it is that is becoming questionable about the thingness of things. For Rilke writes ever earlier from Duino on March 1, 1912: “The world withdraws into itself, and things, for their part, behave in the same way, by transferring their existence increasingly into the vibration of money and developing for themselves a kind of spirituality there that even now exceeds their tangible reality. In the period that I am dealing with” – Rilke means the fourteenth century – “money was still gold, still metal, a lovely object, the handiest, the most lucid thing of all” (Briefe aus den Jahren 1907 bis 1914, p. 213). A decade earlier still, he published in the “Book of Pilgrimage,” the second of the Book of Hours, the far-foreseeing verses (Gesammelte Werke, vol. II, p. 254):

The kings of the world are old, and they will have no heirs. 
The sons are dying as boys, and their pale daughters gave all the sickly crowns to force.

The rabble grinds into specie;
the time-serving lord of the world
distends them in the fire: makes them machines
that grumble and serve his will;
The ore is homesick. Its desire
is to forsake the coins and wheels
that teach it to live small.
And from the factories and from the tills
it will return into the earthly veins;
the adits of the mountains
close behind it on its return.
[...]

The objectiveness of technical domination over the earth is pushing increasingly faster,
more recklessly, and more totally into the place where the worldly content of things used to give
of itself freely since it used to be safeguarded. The mastery not only sets up all beings as
producibles in the process of production, but it also delivers the products of production through
the market. What is human about humans and thingly about things is dissolved, within the self-
assertion of producing, to the calculation of the market value of a market that is not only a global
market spanning the earth but that also, as the will to will, markets in the essence of being and so
brings all beings into the business of calculation, which dominates most fiercely precisely where
numbers are not needed.16

The discussion is part of a broader elucidation of what “will to will” is intended to mean,
a discussion within which the remarks on market seem, as I was saying, “almost” secondary, or,
at least, this would seem to be the case if these remarks did not speak specifically about what is
most important to Heidegger, namely, about “the essence of Being.” However, in spite of this,
the statements on market seem to be the vehicle for explaining something about the will to will,
thus creating the impression that installation of market in the essence of Being, and, therefore, its
centrality, would be only an epiphenomenon of “the rule of Being as the will to will.” Although
these appearances are quite convincing at the level of the text, and even more so in that
Heidegger seems to locate the true centre of the discussion in the “hidden essence of
technology,” it would nevertheless be over-hasty to draw from here the conclusion that market is
something simply secondary.

In 1946, the year when the essay “Why Poets?” was published, the discussion about the
essence of technology was taking place mainly around two concepts: “self-imposing pro-

16 Martin Heidegger, „Why Poets?” in Off the Beaten Track, 218-219. Original: Martin Heidegger, „Wozu Dichter?”
in Holzwege, 291-292.
duction’ [sich durchsetzenden Herstellung] and “will to will,” a pair of terms which, if one pays attention to the fact that Heidegger defines will as pro-duction\(^\text{17}\), are not even “two,” but a same approached from two different angles. Self-imposing pro-duction has to do with the way (modern) man presents and re-presents the world as, among other things, raw material for a world production that takes place in accordance with a representation, and, thus, in accordance with a will. This representation of world as raw material is captured in the logical operation carried out by market as will to will. However, in “The Question Concerning Technology,” although all the thoughts expressed in “Why Poets?” are retained, the concept of market does not appear at all, and the appearance that market is a simple epiphenomenon of the essence of technology seems to be gaining ground.

The truth is that, even if the word “market” does not appear as such in this text, the centrality of Bestand for the overall significance of Ge-stell expresses, I believe, precisely the “thing” made visible in “Why Poets?” in terms of the centrality of market: “bringing all beings into the business of calculation” in accordance with a “will to will.” Furthermore, the centrality of this un-veiling (which is the essence of modern technology) is one in comparison with which – both in 1953 and in 1946 – even the representation of beings according to the schema of subject / object, that is, das Gegenständige, is something derived.\(^\text{18}\) One must therefore say that the market-element in Ge-stell (as will to will and as Bestand) is even more central (more original) than the phenomenon of modern technology (which would have not been possible without the schema of subject / object that grounds modern science). In other words, one must say that market, as will to will, belongs to the fundamental features of the essence of modern

\(^{17}\) M. Heidegger, “Why Poets?” in Off the Beaten Track, 216. “What is called will here is production, or rather production in the sense of the deliberate self-assertion of objectification.”

\(^{18}\) Idem, 217. “Even this, the fact that the man has turned into the subject and the world the object, is a consequence of the self-establishing essence of technology, not the reverse.”
technology (however secondary, from a strictly verbal point of view, the motif of market may be in Heidegger’s writings). As will to will, market is just as much self-imposing pro-duction as are technology, modern science and the total state, which are the other modern phenomena mentioned by Heidegger in the passage to which I am referring\(^\text{19}\). In a sense then, even production in an economic sense, the sense in which it sells its products through a market, is a derived phenomenon in comparison to the “bargaining in the essence of Being” that constitutes the modern essence of market and branches out into the “world” (or “global”) character of market. In other words, what is going on in Heidegger’s text is a localisation of economic production in relation to self-imposing pro-duction, in such a way that the latter becomes (from an onto-phenomeno-logical point of view) the principle of the former. This gives a very precise foretaste of the way in which the essence of technology will be thought of in “The Question Concerning Technology.” For it is only in 1953 that pro-duction will be interpreted onto-phenomeno-logically from the point of view of the un-concealment that it presupposes, and in which it can install itself as Ge-stell, that is, as a way of making beings “visible” (dis-closed). This is a mode of interpretation that presents man as its sole origin and beings (man included) as raw material for a kind of production which is, besides the fact that it is technological (meaning scientific in a modern sense), also economic (in a capitalist sense).

All these relationships are already suggested in 1946, and this happens precisely in the passages which I have reproduced above, passages in which, especially immediately following the quotation from Rilke’s poem, the thought progresses effectively through a “play on words” between the polysemy of Herstellung and its immediate neighbour, its half-synonym in German, the word Produktion.

\(^{19}\) Ibidem. “Modern science and the total state, as necessary consequences of the essence of technology […]”.
If we pay attention to the systematics of what Heidegger does in this passage, that is, to the logical operation through which “world,” “thing” and “human” are matched by the “worldliness of the world,” “thingness of the thing” and “human character of humans,” we will understand at once that *Herstellen* is functioning in a similar fashion here, that is, as an ontological double of *Produktion*, whose essence it is intended to decipher.

(This logical operation is all the more important in that, as we will see, Granel too strives, in his turn, to build a concept of Production that includes or, rather, *thinks together* pro-duction as (re)presentation and production in an economic sense, thus confronting us, from the point of view of our question, with a fresh “strong appearance to the contrary.” But of this more in the next chapter.)

In order to finish with Heidegger, for the time being, I would suggest that the reason why the term “capital” does not appear in his text is most probably because, according to his thought, this notion would refer to something derived in comparison to the onto-phenomeno-logical originality of market (as will to will, as pro-duction), and, thus, to a simple “means” of production, just like “labour,” while market (“marketing,” “bargaining,” “buying and selling commodities”) involves something matrix-like, something more essential even than “capital” (in regard to which Heidegger seems to accept only its real meaning as this or that particular capital). Market is something that has already installed itself in the essence of Being, where it functions as the photographic developer of beings in the light of bargaining. Things seem to be quite clear here.
Let us now repeat this exercise of delving into details for Granel also, and let us start directly by reconstructing the moment of thought from which I extracted the quotation on world market.

[…] Moreover […] one must remark that the modern World does not descend from ancient culture as a development of its philosophy, but as a development of this other branch of the historic uniqueness of the Greeks, that constituted by the discovery of mathematical idealities. […]

[…] In brief, it is the emergence of a world where beings receive the value of an essentially computable object, while man becomes, in his being-man, that is, in his thinking, the subject that masters the calculus of the object.

The culture resulting from here is that of the power over the world. The theory of electricity, flashing more brightly than a storm, erases the difference between day and night; what used to be “the mystery of life” is no longer anything but the field of biological knowledge; astronomy ceases to be popular theology in order to start cutting paths for ships; the elements of bodies and their combinations reveal themselves to chemistry; one could continue for some while the list of these novelties that made the modern age “the time of the New” in an absolute sense: die Neuzeit. It is understandable that such a culture was destined to destroy all others, either by force, which it did not refrain from using, or by the attraction that it exerted over the spirits of other “humanities” which initially coexisted with this culture. It is by its essence that modern culture was destined to become the planetary Monoculture.

As if this had not been enough, there was, and there still is, to reinforce this destiny, another factor besides the nature of modern knowledge: I would like to speak about economic Production. On the one hand, in fact, this Production is possible only because it incorporates the discoveries of science into a constant modification of its procedures and instruments. But this Production is also, so to speak directly a realisation of the historic schema to which we belong. For there is “subject” also here, but in a strange split in which the true subject of production, labour, has become, in its turn, the object of the realisation and infinite self-growth of wealth. However, as regards the actual meaning of object, it is now defined by commodity (an expression whereby one must understand not only the goods, but also labour itself, in line with what we have just said). The apparently banal expression “world market” does not designate only an extension of the phenomenon of economic exchange beyond the borders of nations; it signifies more profoundly that Capital defines the being-world of world itself as “market”. Everything that goes in the direction of commodification (I am sorry for the heaviness of this neologism) has a future; by contrast, what is not “commodity” or “commercial” must disappear. Perhaps the most eloquent sign of the reduction of all cultures to the law of the market is, undoubtedly, this hideous phenomenon that we call “tourism.”

From this reconstruction of its context, one could say that Granel’s statement on market seems to be of a “secondary” character that is in perfect symmetry with the position held by the statement on market in “Why Poets?” In Granel’s case, too, this statement appears to have been made for something else. It is employed to elucidate the so-called “object / commodity” section of the way in which the historic schema of the subject is realized “directly” within the frame of

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20 Gérard Granel, “Monoculture? Inculture?” in Apolis, 82-84.
economic production (and I am keeping Granel’s italics because they highlight well the fact that
global market is rooted in the essence of modernity, an aspect that, and here is the proof, remains
unchanged for him from what it was for Heidegger. The difference is that for the latter “the
historic schema of the subject,” which implies also the subject / object relationship as a matrix of
relating to beings, is not an original schema, but seems to derive from the essence of
technology\textsuperscript{21} – which means that we have here a first micro-difference between Heidegger and
Granel that needs to be noted.

If Granel appears to agree with Heidegger that the centrality of market cannot consist
only in the fact that it has extended itself all over the globe, when it comes to determining its
meaning more precisely, market seems to cease to be the sovereign of its dominion. It is not \textit{the}
market that bargains in the being-world of world, but rather \textit{Capital} defines the being-world of
the world \textit{as} market. “Defines.” It is impossible not to stop at this word. The entire meaning of
what Granel thinks about market seems to be concentrated in this “definition,” which, in contrast
with the banal definition of a definition, not only brings together the basic features of something-
to-be-defined, but \textit{imposes} its postulate, actually engraving it, like a piece of computer software,
in the very matrix of the structural totality of the particular worlds, which is, according to \textit{Being
and Time}, the worldliness of the world (see Chapter Three).

In Granel, however, modernity (from whose program Capital descends and within which
it later gains its autonomy, initially as a subprogram, and later as the Program itself) does not
manage to constitute a world – it leads, \textit{stricto sensu}, to a non-world.\textsuperscript{22} I will not be in too much
hurry to resolve what appears to be leading to a dilemma before which comprehension seems at a

\textsuperscript{21} See \textit{supra}, note 18.

\textsuperscript{22} G. Granel, \textit{De l’Université} (Mauvezin: T. E. R., 1982), 92. “Le temps n’est même plus d’endurer jusqu’au cri, au
silence ou à la folie cette impossibilité historiale de la modernité à former une monde.”
loss, namely: how can one speak about the being-world of a non-world? For the time being, let us allow this tension to install itself as it needs to (for, once it is installed, it will become clear that it is impossible for it to be dissolved without simply missing the path of Granel’s thought; in other words, it is only within this tension that there is any chance that we will be able to trace accurately what Granel thinks).

On the contrary, then, I will say that modernity – “the configuration of possibles called *Neuzeit*” – does not manage to give birth to a world *precisely* because Capital defines the being-world of the world as “market.” Market can never “replace” World, it can never fully move into its place, even though one can live very happily in un-worldliness too (that is, in a time when the worldly content of things is completely concealed by the objectivity of technical domination, to graft here – not as an explanation, but in order to make the comparison easier – Heidegger’s language onto Granel’s), although we can perhaps agree, I hope, that a market – even a global one – is not “exactly” the world (I would be tempted to say “a” world, but there is only one, therefore, one must say “the world”). The market is, before anything else, a concrete-and-abstract (un-real – ideal, formal – *and* real) entity *within which* one buys and sells. Similarly, it is perhaps also quite self-evident that the reasons, the paths, the trajectories of market do not *exhaust* the reasons, the paths and the trajectories of the world: the use value does dissolve thoroughly in the exchange value.

In any case, the fact that economic exchanges insinuate themselves everywhere – and increasingly in such a way that they become the *de facto* censor, the filter for what (among *Dasein*-like beings) has the right to exist and what does not –, could constitute, I believe, one of the points of contact between what Heidegger is intending to convey through his statement that market bargains in the essence of Being and Granel with his claim that the being-world of the
world arrives at being defined as market. Our initial question, the one regarding the difference between Heidegger’s concept of market and Granel’s, seems to find here another “strong appearance to the contrary”: if market (as part of the essence of technology) colonises the open (that is, the essence) of Being, that is, the same “thing” as the worldliness of world, then where is the difference between the two concepts?

I will continue, then, by strengthening this appearance still further. The fact that the rhetorico-logical scaffolding of the two statements about market is different in Heidegger and Granel does not of itself mean that they could not refer to the same thing. Both in Granel and in Heidegger, the schema of the subject (and of the object, of course) underlies the logic of the whole passage (with the already-mentioned micro-difference). The sole more significant difference seems to be, then, the one related to Capital and to the “logical operation” whereby it defines the “being-world of world” as market. This is a very curious result insofar as “capital,” in its most immediately identifiable meaning, a meaning also characterised by the fact that economic exchanges extend themselves beyond national borders (Weltmarkt), has all the time seemed to be – implicitly and explicitly – the common element between Heidegger’s concept of market and Granel’s, insofar as they both agreed about it and came to enrich its meaning along the lines of the market’s centrality or worldliness (“global-ness”). Is it possible, however, that it is precisely here, that is, in that half of their speaking about market in which the two thinkers seem to be in agreement, that we will also find the difference between them? We cannot decide this as yet.

Let us acquaint ourselves better with the details of our passage from Granel, just as we did with the one from Heidegger.
Within economic production, for Granel, subject and object stand in opposition to each other as labour and commodity, but labour is also a commodity and, simultaneously, an object. Of what? Of a self-growing of wealth. This self-, that is, “automatic” growing of wealth seems to be the “engine,” the “aim” that “moves” the world. This automatic wealth is, and this is perhaps perfectly clear already, something slightly different from the essence of modern technology, whose most patent teleology in Heidegger speaks of the global domination of nature (and man) and its transformation into the raw material for a self-imposing production (will to will) which is, simultaneously, also production in an economic sense. Therefore, as regards their levels of logical primitiveness or originality, this automatic growth of wealth, despite the fact that Granel articulates it from the point of view of the subject-object schema, is still slightly different from the “essence of technology.” The automatic growth of wealth originates in the essence of technology along the lines of the distinction between subject and object, but it also reverses the direction of this schema: the subject becomes object (labour becomes commodity), and the object becomes subject (commodity or, rather, “commodification” becomes the principle, the rule, the law). Such things Heidegger never said.

It is only now that we can say and, perhaps, “feel” that the “appearances to the contrary” have started to shake a little, although it is clear that, up to a point, Granel is saying the same thing as Heidegger, and that Heidegger’s notion of market serves, so to speak, as a model for its Granelian namesake (a point never discussed by Granel, but never concealed either, since he decides to say what he has to say through a clearly recognisable paraphrase of a Heideggerian thought). In fact, Granel radicalises Heidegger’s notion of market (which is already a radicalisation in comparison with the most obvious meaning of the same concept in Marx) in the direction, precisely, of Capital (that is, in the direction of Marx) and, simultaneously, of
Heidegger, but he does so by following the thread of a different thought, which I am about to clarify. What does this difference-radicalisation imply and, more importantly, why does it take place at all? We can come closer to an answer to these questions by first returning to another, which we left unanswered above: what does “market” in Granel add to the same term as used by Heidegger?

For Granel, Capital itself is first and foremost a principle, rather than being in the first place this or that real capital (financial, industrial or commercial). But here it is worth following Granel’s formulations in the richness of their details. Thus we will find out that the question is not how things are “for Granel,” but how he understands and demonstrates (to my mind convincingly) that things are in Marx: Granel is not striving “to invent” an unheard-of meaning of the concept of Capital, but attempting to open up a way into the most intrinsic sense of Capital in Marx.

It is not for no reason that, in fact, in his phenomenology of money (for it is one, it becomes urgent to recognize), Marx does not confound the money of Capital-Form (Capital in its essence, or, as he puts it, in its “developed formula”) with any of the three species of “capitals,” which form financial “capital,” commercial “capital,” and industrial “capital.” Capital proper is not reducible, in fact, to any of the three, nor to their simple sum, although these various types of capital always remain the forms of appearance under which Capital manifests itself. If it is called Capital-Form, however, this happens because what is in question is not its apparent form on the surface of the market, but this form which is “phenomenon in a phenomenological sense,” in other words, the law of essence that regulates appearances, and which, being form now in the sense of logical formality, would not know how to appear.

The Capital “itself” is, very precisely, the law of growing capitalisation of real capitals, to which it is fundamentally indifferent, except in the respect that and insofar as it offers itself as an indefinitely modifiable matter, so to speak “malleable” at will, to this power of infinite disruption which hides behind the modest, quasi-philanthropic term: “wealth production.”

We can then see that, paradoxically, at the point where our “appearances” were almost ready to be dispelled, not only do we find ourselves facing a new bifurcation of the difference, one that opens up, this time, between Capital-as-form and real capitals – the forms of appearance that manifest themselves at the level of the market –, but we come up against an even more

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23 G. Granel, “La Production totale” in Apolix, 75.
profound form of non-difference between Heidegger and Granel. For the “phenomenon in a phenomenological sense,” the phenomenon that cannot appear is precisely Heidegger’s meaning of phenomenon – or, more precisely, the meaning of phenomenon that Husserl and Heidegger shared. What we must decide, then, is how this form of non-difference affects the question of our difference engraved in the word “Capital.”

“Phenomenon in a phenomenological sense” is an expression that can be found throughout Granel’s oeuvre, mainly at key-points in his demonstrations. In Heidegger, this meaning of phenomenon can be found in paragraph 7 of Being and Time, where he clarifies what he means by the phenomenological method of investigation. Being constrained to justify why he has placed the maxim “to the things themselves!” on the frontispiece of his inquiry (a motto that would seem to be “self-evident” for all branches of knowledge24), Heidegger takes it upon himself to re-trace the meaning of the concept of “phenomenon,” which in classical Greek means “something that shows itself.” After two pages of discussion, we find out that this is only the “formal” concept of phenomenon, and not “phenomenon in a phenomenological sense,” and at this point I will quote Heidegger in order to show as economically as possible what it is that Granel has in view when he says that phenomenon in a phenomenological sense is (an) in-appearance.

[...] What is it that phenomenology is “to let be seen”? What is it that is to be called “phenomenon” in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence becomes the necessary theme when we indicate something explicitly? Manifestly it is something that does not show itself initially and for the most part, something that is concealed, in contrast to what initially and for the most part does show itself. But at the same time it is something that essentially belongs to what initially and for the most part shows itself, indeed in such a way that it constitutes its meaning and ground.

But what remains concealed in an exceptional sense, or what falls back and is covered up again, or shows itself only in a distorted way, is not this or that being but rather, as we have shown in our foregoing observations, the being of beings. [...]
The phenomenological concept of phenomenon, as self-showing, means the being of beings – its meaning, modifications and derivatives. This self-showing is nothing arbitrary, nor is it something like an appearing. The being of beings can least of all be something “behind which” something else stands, something that “does not appear.”

It is also worth evoking the echoes produced by this conception of phenomenon in Granel’s work, and this not only for the sake of some exegetical reasons, less evident in Heidegger, which show that the thought is, in fact, a Husserlian one, but rather in order to see how Granel installs himself into this conception.

The fundamental phenomenological idea is, in Husserl, the reverse of what it is in Hegel: this idea is Non-manifestation. […] Husserl’s phenomenology is a phenomenology without phenomenon.

This is exactly what characterizes the notion of “phenomenon-in-the-sense-of-phenomenology”. Such a “phenomenon” is what one finds in immanence in the highest sense, that is, in the intimacy of the Absolute. But since this intimacy is non-manifestation, this phenomenon is not at all something that would “appear,” either as the world appears, or as self-consciousness appears to itself; it is, on the contrary, what resides in the “obscure depths of the ultimate self-consciousness” and what constitutes consciousness, as consciousness and as self-consciousness, which means that it [phenomenon] is quite far from pertaining, itself, to such a self-consciousness. This phenomenon, therefore, is immanent only to itself, it consists in a life of the Absolute which is prior to the life of consciousness and constitutive for the latter.

Or, a few pages earlier:

Eliminating now from the “circuit” – that is, from the order of reflections – this empoisoned level, we come back to the purely phenomenological, to “what appears” [l’"apparaissant"], in the sense of the phenomenon-of-phenomenology, which is not at all of the same kind as what shows itself [paraître], the latter being, in its turn, something that “appears” [un apparaissant] without appearing [qui n’apparaît pas] (unless it appears to phenomenological reflection, as its correlative, but this is not, properly speaking, a showing [paraître]).

One needs to take into consideration this idea of in-appearance when one has to think through the meaning of the capitalised expression “Capital” in Granel’s text. It is perhaps surprising to see how the radicalisation of the notion of capital in Marx’s direction takes place along the line of flight of an equally Heideggerian or Husserlian-Heideggerian thought, but what gives us pause for thought, from the point of view of the question of the difference between the

27 Idem, 34.
two concepts of market, is that, just as in Heidegger “market” as principle is, in fact, co-
principled with the essence of technology (it belongs to the latter), a similar co-principal
character, but articulated around different “central points,” seems to be the case in Granel too.
This can be seen from the fact that within the “definition” operated by Capital, a definition that
determines the “being-world of the world” as market, we have to do with a principle (“Capital”) that determines another principle (“the being-world of the world”) through a third principle (“market”). The demonstration that this is the case in Granel is relatively simple, if one pays
attention to how he creates his signifiers. “Being-X of X” or the “to-be-X of X” are precise
formulae whereby he expresses, in fact, the principled character of something. Proofs of this can
be found in many contexts and applied to other concepts also. I will give an example from
Cartesiana.

How then to understand the opposition: principle / becoming? How to understand that an
“arche” [archie] has nothing to do with that “thing” to which it is an arche, while, at the same
time, it reigns over everything that has to do with that “thing”? How to understand that the arche
“always” is, while that which simply pertains to it “produces itself” [se produit]? We may answer
by means of the example of colour (Cf. Meno).

It is not this or that colour, it is in fact none of the colours that we take as an example: it is
the word “colour,” which has no colour, and this by necessity. If, in fact, by “colour” we were to
understand one colour among others – green, for instance – and thus colour would be green, how
would red be a colour? “Colour” must signify any colour and, for this, it must not designate any.
Colour signifies a determinate way of being of beings, which, as a “way,” does not include itself
in the number of beings. Colour is, therefore, not more in the rainbow than “fruit” is in apples,
pears, cherries, etc.

The colour (being-coloured) is the arch-colour of all coloured beings, and this principle is
colourless: it never “becomes” of a certain colour, and, consequently, does not lose any colour. A
condition for it to be a “principle” – that is, one of the ways in which being [l’étant] is originally
practised, always-already opened up. And the reason why the painter declares indifferently (and
correctly) that “there is no colour in nature” or that “nature is blue” (Monet). While the Hopi
Indians have given the same name to green and blue.

To this principle, which, in fact, begins never and nowhere in the realm of beings, the
latter, however, owe, in their turn, their beginning, their continuation and their end under all
colours. Between beings and their arché the difference is, therefore, total, but this is not a
difference that would oppose two “realities,” one of which would be intelligible and the other
sensible, one directing the other. This translation of the relationship between aei on and
gignomenon (between the “always-already” and the “becoming”) in substantial terms is, par excellence, the metaphysical regime of thinking. Or, if one prefers, Platonism.  

The first reason why I have quoted this passage was to show at once how “Capital” and “being-world of world” are both principles. The second is that of applying the logic of the principle (articulated in the language of onto-logical difference) to the meaning of Granel’s statements about the character or nature of Capital as a principle, insofar as the latter defines (“the being-world of the world” as market) and directs (appearances as their “law of essence”). I did not take this step merely in order to rush to identify in Granel some kind of a “contradiction,” in the guise of some imaginary “Platonism” of which he might not yet have rid himself (since one could believe that in his case too something “intelligible” – Capital – directs, governs, commands the “sensible” – financial capital, commercial capital, industrial capital), but rather with the aim of highlighting the fact that, strange as it may appear, the capitalized form of “Capital” does not designate a reality (a being) but a principle, a law in the sense established above, that is, a mode-of-being (and therefore, in a strange way, “Being” as such). As regards our main question, that is, the question of the difference between the two concepts of market, we should say, therefore, that in Granel it is not the essence of technology (market included) that has a central value, but Capital itself. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is, as I will show in the next chapter, untenable, for behind everything that Granel says about Capital there lies a concept of Production that in fact also incorporates the features of Ge-stell. In other words, the question of the difference between the two concepts of market progresses towards the difference between the essence of technology and Granel’s concept of Production, and this is precisely what is not evident in the contexts in which I initiated our discussion.